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The so-called 'Minijob-reform', that was introduced in April 2003 as part of
the 'Hartz II'-reform, was intended to increase work incentives for people
with low wages and thereby reduce structural unemployment. Therefore,
the hours restriction of 15 hours per week was abolished and the threshold
up to which earnings remain free of social security contributions (SSC) was
increased.
We calculate the labor market effects and the effects on income tax and
SSC on the basis of a micro simulation model. The analysis also includes
indirect effects on total income tax and SSC resulting from the labor market
effects of the reform. These effects consist of both, the effects from people
not employed before the reform and the effects from people who were
already working before the reform and whose labor supply reactions mostly
remain disregarded in the political debate.
The estimations show that the 'Minijob-reform' led to a small increase in
the number of people in marginal employment. The effects on employment
in secondary jobs and the potential legalization of illicit work are, however,
not taken into account in this analysis. Persons who have already been
working before the reform reduce their working hours. This leads to a small
decrease in total working hours throughout the population.
Labor market effects
The labor market effects of the 'Minijob-reform' crucially depend on the
resulting changes in work incentives (see box). The estimation presented
here is based on a micro simulation model, which embeds a micro-economet-
ric household labor supply model.1 This model is based on data from the
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which is collected by DIW Berlin in coopera-
tion with Infratest Sozialforschung.
1  For a detailed description of the model and estimation results, see Viktor Steiner and Katha-
rina Wrohlich: "Work Incentives and Labor Supply Effects of the 'Minijob-reform' in Ger-
many". DIW Discussion Paper, no. 438. Berlin 2004.
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The main results can be summarized as follows:
–   The effect on the number of employed persons is rel-
atively small and amounts to 53 000 persons (36 000
full-time equivalents; cf. table 1). Since this number
is relatively low, we expect that this additional sup-
ply can be absorbed by labor demand without
change in wages. Therefore, we regard the labor sup-
ply effect as equal to the labor market effect. 
–   Those people who were already employed before the
reform reduce their working hours by 1.5 million
hours per week (39 000 full-time equivalents).
–   Overall working hours are reduced by 79 000 hours
per week (about 2000 full-time equivalents). Thus,
the positive participation effect and the negative
hours effect of those already working cancel each
other out.
–   The group of people who react most to the reform
are part-time working secondary earners, mostly
married women. For these people, the reform intro-
duced incentives to reduce working hours by subsi-
dizing SSC for low earnings. On average, the work-
ing hours of this group are reduced by 1%.
It is important to stress some of the limitations of
our analysis at this point. In this study, only the labor
supply reactions of the 'main labor force' is analyzed.
Students, pensioners and the self-employed, as well as
people in vocational training are not included. It is to be
assumed, however, that the 'Minijob-reform' has led to
an increase in the employment of these groups.
Furthermore, the possibility of taking up a minijob
as a secondary job could not be taken into account. The
same applies to the possible legalization of illicit work.
Work incentives of the 'Minijob-reform'
Subsidies to Social Security Contributions (SSC) already
existed before April 2003 for so-called marginal employment
('geringfügige Beschäftigung'). Up to a threshold of euro 325
per month, salaries were exempt from employee's SSC and
income tax. Above this threshold, contributions and income
tax were due on the whole amount of earnings, leading to
high effective marginal tax rates above euro 325. This made
employment at low wages above this threshold financially
unattractive.
The reform increased the threshold of euro 325 to euro 400
(so-called 'mini-jobs') and introduced subsidies to SSC for
salaries between euro 401 and euro 800 (so-called 'midi-
jobs'). Above euro 400, employees' SSC amount to 4% of the
salary and increase linearly until they reach the regular 21%
for salaries of euro 800. Additionally, the hours restriction of
15 hours per week as a prerequisite for eligibility to subsidies
was abolished. Income tax fully sets in at euro 400, similar to
before the reform, when it set in at euro 325. Employers have
to pay SSC of 25% of the salary for all minijobbers, which
includes a 2% lump-sum income tax. For salaries above euro
800, employers pay the regular rate of 21% of SSC. Employ-
ers who are private households have to pay SSC at a
reduced rate of 12%. The intention of this measure was to
reduce illicit work in private households. In order to boost the
demand for services by private households even further, the
expenditures for SSC for these kind of jobs can be deducted
from the income tax of the household.
The work incentives of this reform have to be distinguished
for several different groups:
–  Work incentives increased for people who are not eligible
for transfers such as unemployment benefits or social
assistance. Since this group of people largely consists of
secondary earners in couple households, the incentives
for taking up a job with a salary higher than euro 400 are
weak, due to the joint income taxation of married
spouses in Germany.
–  Work incentives for people receiving unemployment ben-
efits or social assistance have hardly been changed by
the reform, since withdrawal rates of these transfers have
not been altered. The average unemployment benefit
amounts to euro 720 per month, whereas a 'midijob' at
euro 800 leads to a net income of euro 650 per month.
Thus, taking up these jobs is still financially unattractive
for unemployment benefit receivers. According to the leg-
islation up until the end of 2004, income above euro 165
per month was fully withdrawn for people receiving
unemployment benefits. Since this amount even lies
below the subsidy threshold before the 'Minijob-reform',
work incentives for this group have not changed. How-
ever, there might be changes due to the so-called 'Hartz
IV' reform, which was introduced in January 2005. This
reform changed withdrawal rates for receivers of unem-
ployment assistance to about 70%.1
–  Students and pensioners might profit from the reform.
The increase of the threshold up to which salaries remain
exempt from SSC will probably lead to a higher employ-
ment in these groups.
–  Negative incentives can be expected for working people
with salaries just above euro 800. The new subsidies
make it financially attractive to reduce working hours.
Thus, while there might be a positive participation effect,
the effect on total working hours is not clear and can only
be assessed on the basis of empirical studies.
1   Under the new 'Hartz IV' legislation, the withdrawal rates of trans-
fers amounts to 85% up to a monthly salary of euro 400. Between
euro 401 and euro 900, 70% are withdrawn, and between 901 and
1800 the withdrawal rate is again 85%. For jobs with a monthly salary
of euro 400, therefore only euro 60 remain 'tax-free', in contrast to
euro 165 before the 'Hartz IV' reform. Only with a job yielding a salary
of euro 751 or more, a person receiving unemployment assistance
would gain more in net income than before the 'Hartz II' reform.
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There is still no reliable data on this issue. All in all,
these limitations may lead to an under-estimation of the
positive effects of the reform.
Comparing these results with the numbers that were
recently published by the German Labor Office
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit, BA), at the first sight there
appear to be significant discrepancies. The BA statistics
show that the number of minijobs rose by 523 000 from
March 2003 to March 2004,2 which is about ten times the
number that we estimate. To a large extent, this differ-
ence is due to the fact that our number of 53 000
includes persons additionally employed, whereas the
number of the BA includes additional mini-jobs. The BA
number includes 241 000 persons who had been work-
ing at a monthly salary between euro 326 and euro 400,
and whose contract was per definition transferred into a
minijob, without any change in working hours.3 Fur-
thermore, the BA's number includes 196 000 persons,
who had been working full-time or part-time before the
reform and who reduced their working hours after the
reform so that they now hold a minijob. Thus, only the
remaining 86 000 minijobs are held by persons who
were not employed before the reform. Assuming that a
third of this group are pensioners and students, these
numbers are very close to our estimations of about
50 000 additional employees.
It is to be assumed the effect is larger for people tak-
ing up a minijob as a secondary job. According to the
BA the number of secondary jobs rose by 850 000
between March 2003 and March 2004. This effect can
not be estimated in our study. However, there is evi-
dence that a considerable part of these new jobs are
transformations of contracts held by freelancers.4
Effects on total income tax and social 
security contributions
The 'Minijob-reform' also affects total income tax and
social security revenues. The total effect consists of two
parts: Firstly, there is the effect before any behavioral
changes take place. Income tax and SSC changes only
due to the new legislation. Secondly, the behavioral
changes of households lead to a further change in these
revenues, e.g. changes caused by an adjustment in labor
supply. Table 2 summarizes the effects on income tax
and SSC that are calculated on the basis of the micro
simulation model.
As expected, the effect on income tax and SSC with-
out behavioral change is small, but negative. The labor
supply effect, which is also estimated based on the simu-
lations, leads to a further reduction in total revenues. All
in all, income tax revenues decline by 370 million euro
per year, whereas employee's SSC decline by 811 million
euro per year.
The change in employer's contributions to social
security is not equal to the change in employee's SSC.
Employer's contributions are due from the first euro of
the salary, therefore the loss in employer's contributions
2  See Bundesagentur für Arbeit: 'Mini- und Midijobs in Deutschland'.
Sonderbericht. Nürnberg 2004.
3  See Ulrich Walwei: 'Arbeitsmarktwirkungen einer Senkung von
Sozialabgaben'. Mimeo, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsfor-
schung (IAB). Nürnberg 2004.
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Numbers in brackets show 95%-confidence intervals.
Sources: SOEP; DIW Berlin calculations.
4  See Jürgen Schupp and Elisabeth Birkner: 'Kleine Beschäftigungs-
verhältnisse: Kein Jobwunder'. In: Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin,
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is less and amounts to about 135 million euro per year.
Furthermore, employer's contributions are due for the
53 000 additional employees holding a minijob, which
yields an additional revenue of 64 million euro.
There are still no reliable empirical studies on labor
supply changes for pensioners and students. Therefore,
we roughly estimate the potential effects for this group
(cf. table 3). One indicator is the difference between the
BA statistic of 86 000 new mini-jobbers and our estima-
tion of 53 000. Assuming that the difference consists of
pensioners and students, this presents a group of about
30 000 persons who are not considered in the results pre-
sented in table 2. Assuming further, that these persons
all hold a minijob with a monthly salary of euro 400,
employer's SSC of 33 million euro per year are due for
this group, plus 3 million euro lump-sum tax. Thus, the
total effect of the additional employment of students and
pensioners leads to a small increase in revenues.
The results summarized in table 2 do not include
minijobs held as secondary jobs. Since April 2003,
employees do not have to pay SSC for wages earned in
these jobs. This new legislation leads to two effects:
First, contributions for already existing contracts drop
out. Second, since the reform has made these jobs finan-
cially more attractive, other contracts (e.g. those held by
free-lancers) are possibly transferred into secondary
minijobs. Referring to the first effect, the IAB (Institut
für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung) states that
losses in contributions amount to about 327 million
euro. Estimations of changes in SSC due to the second
effect are not available so far.
In order to estimate the total effect on income taxes,
revenues resulting from the 2% lump-sum tax also have
to be taken into account. According to the BA, there
were 4.4 million 'minijobbers' in August 2003. Assum-
ing that all of them receive a salary of euro 400 per
Table 2
Fiscal Effects Based on Micro Simulation
In million euro
Effect before behavioral change Effect of behavioral change Total effect













































Numbers in brackets show 95%-confidence intervals.






Employees' social security contributions (SSC)1 –811
Employers' SSC –130
Income tax1 –370
Additional employers' SSC1 59
Employers' SSC for additional minijobs by students 
and pensioners 33
Drop-out of SSC of minijobs as secondary jobs –327
2 % lump sum tax for all (old and new) minijobs 493
Total –1 053
1 Based on simulations by Steiner and Wrohlich (2004).
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month, the revenue of the lump-sum tax amounts to
about 500 million euro per year.
Lastly, there might be a fiscal effect due to the reduc-
tion in transfer payments. However, as stated earlier, the
incentives for transfer receivers to take up work have
not changed. Therefore, no savings are to be expected in
this respect.
Table 3 summarizes all the effects described above.
As these numbers show, the reform _ as it has been ana-
lyzed here _ resulted in a loss of 1 billion euro in income
tax and SSC.
Conclusions for economic policy
As the results from our estimation show, the 'Minijob-
reform' did not lead to a large increase in employment:
Although there is a small positive effect on participa-
tion, this effect is cancelled out by the reduction of work-
ing hours by persons who were already employed before
the reform. All in all, total labor supply does not change.
The fiscal effects of the reform depend on the labor mar-
ket effects. According to our estimation, income tax and
SSC decrease by 1 billion euro. In contrast to what was
hoped by politicians, this reform is not self-financed by
savings in transfer payments.
The results that are presented here are in line with
the statistics on the development of minijobs after the
reform. It should be stressed that the statistics pub-
lished by the BA include minijobs held as secondary
jobs, minijobs held by persons who were already
employed before the reform, and minijobs held by stu-
dents and pensioners.
Overall, the 'Minijob-reform' can hardly be seen as a
success: firstly, it did not lead to a reduction in unem-
ployment. Secondly, it induced additional costs, as we
have shown in our simulations. Our evaluation, how-
ever, does not take into account possible positive effects
resulting from a legalization of formerly illicit work.